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IS THERE "LIFE" (OR "CHOICE") 
AFTER ROE? 
Ronald K.L. Collins* 
"Eventually, Roe v. Wade will fall," predicts Senator John P. 
East. One need not side with the Senator from North Carolina's 
view of things in order to sense that Roe may be in trouble.' Every-
where you turn, the air is thick with talk of abortion. This Term, 
the Justice Department asked the Supreme Court to overrule the 
landmark precedent. Likewise, eighty-two members of Congress 
have filed a separate brief urging the Justices to move away from the 
holding. On the other side, Harvard Law Professor Laurence 
Tribe, speaking on behalf of eighty-one other members of Congress, 
has filed counter papers intended to buttress the abortion right. 
And a noteworthy brief has been filed on behalf of the National 
Abortion Rights Action League, asking the Court to sensitize itself 
to "the realities of abortion in women's lives."2 
• Writer, Washington, D.C.; Adjunct Professor of Law, Willamette University, Ore-
gon. Steven Shiffrin and George Anastaplo were always generous in supplying me with 
thoughtful advice. 
I. Virtually every conservative cannon is trained on the Roe landmark. One Reagan 
appointment to the Supreme Court could dramatically change current abortion policies. Al-
ready, there are three nearly certain votes to overrule Roe: Justices White, Rehnquist, and 
O'Connor. Chief Justice Burger is a likely ally even though he cast a vote for the original 
opinion. See B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 165-89, 229-40 (1979). 
Since then, his voting record has been, with a few curious exceptions, hostile to Roe. Re-
cently, former Solicitor General Rex Lee told an audience of lawyers that in his opinion the 
Chief Justice could certainly change his Roe vote given the right opportunity. Rex Lee, 
Remarks at U.S. Law Week's Constitutional Law Conference (Sept. 14, 1985). If Justice 
Powell were to retire before the November 1986 elections, Roe's future might well be in 
serious jeopardy. If, however, the Democrats were to regain control of the Senate in 1986, 
then perhaps a newly composed Committee on the Judiciary would reject even a qualified 
Reagan appointee. For an insightful and provocative introduction to this imagined state of 
affairs, see L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT (1985). 
2. The authors of this brief, Ms. Lynn M. Paltrow and Ms. Lynn I. Miller, have pre-
pared in an artful way a document that weaves law and human experience together. That is, 
"[i]n addition to presenting social science and medical data Amici present excerpts from some 
of the thousands of letters received in response to the national campaign 'Abortion Rights: 
Silent No More.' " Amicus Brief on Behalf of National Abortion Rights League at 5, Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 45 (1985). The au-
thors add: "while these letters do not constitute sworn testimony or record evidence, they do 
provide an invaluable source of information about the lives of women who chose to have an 
abortion." /d. at 8. Quite apart from the quality of the brief, I wonder about the propriety 
and prudence of the tack taken. First, note that the Paltrow-Miller brief, unlike the Brandeis 
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I do not wish to enter the thicket of the debate over whether 
Roe should be overruled. That is a topic for another occasion.3 
Rather, my purpose in this paper is to ask: what would happen if 
Roe v. Wade were overturned? By defining the issue solely in terms 
of whether Roe was correctly decided, both sides have neglected an 
all-important political question: what would happen in a post-Roe 
world if the Constitution did not shield women seeking abortions? 
Should the abortion controversy ever move from the judicial to the 
legislative chambers, the probable scenarios could bring unexpected 
victories and losses for both sides. I want to move away from the 
impassioned rhetoric that has so long impeded reasoned debate on 
the topic. My aim is to urge partisans to consider the implications 
of their positions. In order to do this I shall start with Roe's demise 
(for better or worse) as a given and proceed from there to several 
possible state and federal legislative, judicial, and political scena-
rios. What follows is no more than a sketch, but one that may 
prompt partisans to pause, if only to reflect upon the prudence of 
their respective positions. 
THE STATE LEGISLATIVE SCENARIO 
In their rush to overrule Roe, its critics seem oblivious to the 
obvious: once the abortion right is stripped of its federal constitu-
tional cloak, "pro-choice" defenders will apply pressure on legisla-
tors with all the fervor of a martyr's cause. Just as Roe was the 
catalyst of a "pro-life" movement,4 so too could its demise carry the 
"pro-choice" movement to the zenith of its political power.s 
If Roe should topple, there would be an immediate flurry of 
lobbying in the statehouses of this land. Most likely, neither side 
would be pleased by the predictable outcome: a patchwork quilt of 
brief, comes to the court in an amicus capacity. Second, the evidence introduced is admit-
tedly outside of the record and was presented for the first time when the case reached the 
Supreme Court. Third, one reason, though not necessarily the paramount one, for presenting 
this new evidence is to influence the Court in a way that the law cannot. Fourth, this entire 
enterprise is directed to an issue not properly before the Court. If this practice, however well 
executed, is to be encouraged, why shouldn't "pro-life" advocates have an equal opportunity 
to "sensitize" the Court by introducing their own testimonial letters accompanied by stills 
from the movie "The Silent Scream"? Moreover, once permitted this practice could just as 
well be extended to other classes of cases. Is that a salutary course for the law to take? 
3. Despite all of the controversy generated by the Justice Department's involvement in 
the 1985-86 abortion cases, it is highly unlikely that the Burger Court as presently constituted 
will retreat from the core right recognized in Roe. 
4. See K. LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 137-57 (1984) 
("What neither the Court nor anyone else anticipated was that the Roe decision would mobil-
ize a new and much stronger opposition to abortion reform"). 
5. See Grossman, Abortion and Economic Crisis in WHEN BIOLOGY BECAME 
DESTINY: WOMEN IN WEIMAR AND NAZI GERMANY 68, 70, 74 (R. Bridenthal ed. 1984) 
(describing public turmoil following passage of anti-abortion laws). 
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laws that made "murder" or "choice" permissible in some jurisdic-
tions but not in others. The result could be one similar to the laws 
that prevailed in the states on the eve of Roe. 
In 1972 four states in one way or another allowed for certain 
types of abortion on request. Some fifteen others (including Califor-
nia, Kansas, and North Carolina) had laws that basically permitted 
abortion if a woman's physician determined that the continuance of 
pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or mental health of 
the mother or that the child might be born with a grave physical 
defect. 6 Abortion was also allowed if the pregnancy was the result 
of rape (forcible or statutory) or incest. Thus, more than a third of 
the states permitted abortions that were objectionable to the "pro-
life" advocates of the 1980's. (Bear in mind the significance of lib-
eral residency requirements in states with liberal abortion policies. 
For example, during oral argument in Roe, counsel for the appel-
lant stated: "[T]here have been something like 1,600 Texas women 
who have gone to New York City alone for abortions in the first 
nine months of 1971."7) The remainder of the states had laws that 
would strike post-Roe feminists as unacceptably restrictive. 
THE FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE SCENARIO 
Dissatisfied with uneven success in the states, opponents of 
abortion might turn to Congress. In the national legislative arena, 
6. Even after Roe, would a state be prohibited from enacting and enforcing a criminal 
law that had enhanced penalties for any woman who took illegal drugs, such as cocaine, 
during pregnancy? Would the state have a constitutionally sufficient interest in preventing 
birth defects? See Chasnoff, Cocaine Use in Pregnancy, II NEW ENG. I. MED., Sept. 12, 
1985, at 313. A strong case could be made defending the constitutionality of such laws. If so, 
can the right vouchsafed in Roe be said to be absolute even during the first trimester? See 
generally Parness, The Duty To Prevent Handicaps: Laws Promoting the Prevention of Handi· 
caps to Newborns, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 431 (1983). 
7. If Roe were overruled and Texas reinstated its previous anti-abortion law, would it 
be possible for state lawmakers to enact a valid law penalizing or restricting the option of 
Texas residents to secure abortions in another state? What if Texas declared fetuses older 
than six weeks to be "persons" entitled to protection under the state constitution and state 
laws? (Assume as well that the Supreme Court never ruled on the personhood question.) 
Under such circumstances, could a state law then survive a federal constitutional challenge? 
Could the state in the interests of the fetus enjoin a pregnant woman from leaving Texas for 
the purpose of obtaining an abortion in another jurisdiction? Could it penalize a woman in 
some criminal or civil way upon her return? 
I suspect that the lawful power of any state to act in such a manner is at best questiona-
ble. I raise the question primarily to demonstrate the lengths to which some lawmakers 
might possibly go in order to prevent their own citizens from obtaining abortions elsewhere 
once abortion is made illegal in one's home state. See generally Findlay, Criminal Liability 
for Complicity in Abortions Committed Outside Ireland, 15 IRISH JURIST 88 (1980); Com-
ment, The Right To Life of the Unborn-An Assessment of the Eighth Amendment to the Irish 
Constitution, 1984 B.Y.U. L. REV. 371, 383 (proposal to extend criminal jurisdiction for 
abortions abroad and to enjoin women from leaving Ireland for abortions, measure failed). 
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neither side could easily win a satisfactory victory. Since 1973, 
Congress has been reluctant to do much more than pass a variety of 
abortion funding restrictions. These fiscal restraints on Roe, even 
when tied to righteous rhetoric, are poor indicators of congressional 
behavior concerning the substance of the right to an abortion. Since 
Roe was handed down, reports the Alan Guttmacher Institute, 
some 217 anti-abortion constitutional amendments have been pro-
posed in the House and Senate as of the end of the 1984 legislative 
year. All went nowhere, even after President-elect Reagan's 1980 
plea to Congress to "pass a constitutional amendment to protect the 
rights of all innocent human life." Similarly, nearly all statutory 
attempts to undermine Roe, other than fiscal ones, have met the fate 
that tabled the controversial "Human Life Statute." 
What, then, would Congress be apt to do when pressed to en-
act abortion legislation? Attempting to compromise, legislators 
might outlaw abortion subject to some important exceptions. For 
example, one exception might leave the abortion decision to a wo-
man and her doctor during the first trimester of pregnancy, with 
restrictions thereafter. Congress might also restrict abortions for 
minors. By casting the general law in anti-abortion terms (an ap-
peal to principle) subject to exceptions (a concession to pragma-
tism), federal lawmakers might be in a better position to 
accommodate ideological differences. 
Whatever path Congress might elect to travel, legal problems 
would persist. This is because it is questionable whether Congress 
has the constitutional authority to enact a national abortion statute. 
In this regard, at least three scenarios are worth considering. 
First, Congress might rest its authority to enact federal abor-
tion laws on the fourteenth amendment, claiming that it was pro-
tecting the lives and liberty of fetuses. The rub, of course, is that 
Congress would first have to define a fetus as a person within the 
meaning of the fourteenth amendment. In the first instance, that 
would be a political problem. Ultimately, the issue would be tested 
in the courts. Moreover, there would be the nagging "state action" 
problem. That is, if there were a national prohibition against any or 
certain abortions, how would any state be violating the fourteenth 
amendment in a situation where a woman went to a private physi-
cian for an abortion? 
Alternatively, Congress could contend that its authority to cre-
ate national abortion laws stems from its duty to protect what it 
deems to be the constitutional reproductive liberties of women. 
That, however, would be difficult to sell to a Court that had previ-
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ously overruled Roe.s A more cautious Congress, left with some lee-
way by a future Court, might decide to "entice" the states to accept 
national norms by threatening to withhold funds for one or another 
federally subsidized state program. Of course, Congress might re-
sort to hinging its power on what Gerald Gunther has, in another 
context, labeled a "tenuously related commerce clause" theory. 
That is, building on the precedent of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
Congress could, to quote Gunther again, construct an "artificial 
commerce facade." Thus, legislators might pass a law that provides 
that no drugs or instruments sold or transported in interstate com-
merce may be used to perform abortions. A future Court, neverthe-
less, might not allow Congress the same measure of constitutional 
latitude previously extended in cases such as Katzenbach v. 
McClung. 
STATE AND FEDERAL COURT SCENARIOS 
Moving away from the state and federal legislatures, two other 
possible scenarios test the imagination. Failing, to whatever extent, 
at the local and national levels, a new generation of anti-abortionists 
could resort to what was once unthinkable: petitioning a court for 
relief. A "pro-choice" statute, they would argue, should be struck 
down on the ground that it violates constitutionally protected fetal 
rights. (That was the approach taken in 1974 by the Christian 
Democrats in West Germany.) Stranger still, imagine "pro-choice" 
backers arguing in favor of judicial deference to the legislative will. 
"Pro-choice" defenders might themselves tum again to the courts 
for help even after Roe's demise. For example, they might ask a 
state court to strike down an anti-abortion statute on state constitu-
tional grounds.9 If a state tribunal, such as the Montanaio or Loui-
siana II Supreme Court, were to set aside an anti-abortion law 
because it violated a woman's state constitutional privacy right, the 
8. In saying this I am not unmindful of what the Court said in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 
384 U.S. 641 (1966). I am equally aware of the gloss the Court has painted on the precedent. 
See generally G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 952-71 (lith ed. 1985). See also 
Schrock, Welsh & Collins, Interrogational Rights: Reflections on Miranda v. Arizona, 52 S. 
CAL L. REv. I, 6 n.21 (1978). Morgan and its progeny might thus be construed so as to 
permit Congress to find some type of abortion right in the Constitution that an anti-Roe court 
had previously ruled did not exist in the same document. Though possible, I do not find such 
a scenario likely. 
9. Already, the decisions of the Massachusetts, New Jersey, and California high courts 
can be read to establish a state constitutional right to abortion which would survive Roe's 
demise. See Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982); Committee to Defend 
Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981); Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 
417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981). 
10. See MONT. CoNST. art. II, § 10 (right of privacy guarantee). 
II. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (right of privacy guarantee). 
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only remaining federal "pro-life" judicial option would be to urge 
the United States Supreme Court to hold that the federal Constitu-
tion somehow protects the life of a fetus, the laws of Congress and 
the states notwithstanding. 
Perhaps in the end this anticipated swirl of state and federal 
action would place the abortion issue back in the laps of nine life-
tenured federal Justices. If so, the Court would be forced to face 
the formidable question: Are fetuses persons in the legal sense that 
they are entitled to the basic safeguards provided by the supreme 
law of the land? If the Court were to answer that question in the 
affirmative, such a ruling would place the abortion question beyond 
lawmakers' reach. Only a constitutional amendment could then re-
vive the right cherished by many feminists. 
The current abortion debate is clouded to the point that it has 
produced a myopic view of what might happen if Roe were over-
ruled. In the midst of it all, critics and defenders of Roe continue to 
await its possible downfall with anticipated elation or despair. All 
the while, one side has not anticipated the losses that might accom-
pany "victory," while the other has not anticipated the victories 
that might accompany a "loss."12 
12. This phrase is one that I have altered and adapted for my purposes. See L. 
STRAUSS, LIBERALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 223 (1968). 
The current abortion controversy can be seen as an instructive lesson in constitutional 
law and politics. The debate can be understood in terms of what President Reagan has called 
the tension between the "sanctity of life ethic" and the "quality of life ethic." R. REAGAN, 
ABORTION AND THE CONSCIENCE OF THE NATION 34 (1984). In the course of the debate 
both sides invoke the Constitution in a way that leaves the impression that it "cannot be 
objectively deduced or passively discerned in a viewpoint-free way." L. TRIBE, CONSTITU· 
TIONAL CHOICES 26 (1985) (addressing "fundamental constitutional norms" generally). 
That is, so the argument runs, "the Constitution cannot itself dictate, in a manner that frees 
its users of responsibility for choice, how it is to be approached." /d. If so, and if only for the 
sake of discussion, one can agree with Laurence Tribe and at the same time maintain that 
people of conscience, indeed reasonable people, might make constitutional choices different 
from the ones that he and Justice Bl&ckmun would have the nation live by. See, e.g., Nakell, 
The Right to Life, II HUMAN LIFE REV., Fall 1985, at 54 ("pro-life" position advanced by 
active ACLU member); Hentoff, A Heretic in the ACLU, II HUMAN LIFE REV., Fall 1985, at 
101 (well-known civil libertarian defending "pro-life" stance). In this regard, it is also well to 
remember that in 1975 the West German Constitutional Court ruled 6-2 that the protections 
of its supreme law extended as well to the unborn. Is all of this but another way of question-
ing the wisdom of casting the abortion debate in its present constitutional mold? See G. 
CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW 95-96 (1985) (noting how Roe 
made constitutional outsiders of those who subscribe to the "pro-life" ethic). Perhaps the 
answer to this question has less to do with the Court making constitutional choices than with 
setting the groundwork for others to make certain choices. 
